Are the similarities just coincidence or was Taierzhuang the model for Stalingrad?
Zhukov and Chuikov the 2 commanders instrumental in the victory at Stalingrad had both been in the USSR military delegation in China.
Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov had been tasked by the USSR to observe and study the modus operandi of the Japanese Army invading China. Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov was USSR Military Attaché in China from December 1940 to March 1942, and was appointed to command the defense of Stalingrad on 12 September 1942.
After the resounding victory masterminded by Li Zong Ren at Taierzhuang, Jiang Jie Shi (Chiang Kai Shek) flew in all available foreign representatives to witness China’s resounding victory against Japan.
Was Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was one of those witnesses?
The next year Zhukov used a similar strategy and tactics to win his victory at the Battle of Khalkin-Gol in 1939. In 1942/1943, Zhukov and Chuikov used a startlingly similar modus operandi to win the Battle of Stalingrad.
Although the raid on Taranto was the model for the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese themselves have always been reticent on this aspect. All who are aware of WW2 are aware of the raid on Pearl Harbor but few are aware that the British raid on Taranto on the night of 11/12 November 1940 was the model for the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor on 7/8 December 1941. Within a week of the raid on Taranto, Japan had ordered its Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin, Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, to fly to Taranto to "investigate the attack and estimate the damage". Naito was the first of many other Japanese officers to probe the Italians for all possible details of the raid. Naito shared his findings with Genda Minoru and Fuchida Mitsuo who were both instrumental in the planning and execution of the raid on Pearl Harbour.
Similarly, although the Battle of Taierzhuang was the model for the Battle of Stalingrad, the USSR itself had always been reticent on this aspect. Most who are aware of WW2 and Stalingrad consider Stalingrad to be pivotal in WW2 but very few are aware that China’s victory at Taierzhuang in 1938 was the model for the USSR’s victory at Stalingrad in 1943.
But WW2 buffs, historians and military historians are unaware even that there was a Battle of Taierzhuang – this illustrates that WW2 in China is a blind spot.
Japanese cavalry at Taierzhuang, 1938. The controversy of Polish cavalry versus German tanks in WW2 – for example, the Charge at Krojanty on 1 September 1939 – endures but the prevailing view now is that it was a myth. WW2 buffs, historians and military historians are aware of that myth – but unaware of the fact of cavalry at Taierzhuang in 1938. Each of the 3 Japanese divisions in the Battle of Taierzhuang had its own regiment of cavalry. The Chinese had their own cavalry too. The first shot of the Battle for Taierzhuang itself was fired at daybreak on 23 March 1938 when Japanese cavalry clashed with Chinese troops in the Kangzhuang – Nigou area 20 kilometers north of Taierzhuang.
To give an insight into this blind spot, Lance Olsen will be publishing a book detailing the Battle of Taierzhuang for the reader to see the Battle of Stalingrad and WW2 in perspective.
The victory at Taierzhuang in 1938 is a victory of the Chinese people against Japanese militarism which proved that Japanese militarism could be defeated. The victory at Stalingrad in 1943 is a victory of the USSR/Russian people against Nazism which proved that Nazism could be defeated.
Had Zhukov fought the battles of Nomonhan/Khalkin-Gol (1939) and Stalingrad (1942) differently, the results might have been different – with correspondingly different effects on the course and outcome of World War 2.
Therefore, it is necessary to see Taierzhuang and Stalingrad in perspective to truly understand why World War 2 developed the way it did and the results.
Lest I be misunderstood, although the Japanese were defeated in the Battle of Taierzhuang and the Germans were defeated in the Battle of Stalingrad – my book is not a criticism or condemnation of Japanese or Germans but a criticism of people being misled. The cost of being misled is to become a victim of the leader. Ultimately, the people who were misled – by the falsehoods of the Japanese militarists and the German Nazis – became victims by believing in the falsehoods.
In militarist Japan and Nazi Germany those who questioned the falsehoods were assassinated, imprisoned or executed. At the end of WW2, the Japanese renounced militarism and the Germans renounced Nazism and both peoples achieved the prosperity that militarism and Nazism promised but could not deliver. One purpose of my book is to point this out for the present and future generations to avoid repeating the same mistakes.
If you missed Page 1 go now to Page 1 
Excerpts of the book – 
